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Adaptively Secure Identity-Based
Broadcast Encryption With a
Constant-Sized Ciphertext
Jongkil Kim, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE, Man Ho Au, Member, IEEE,
and Jennifer Seberry, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— In this paper, we present an adaptively secure
identity-based broadcast encryption system featuring constant
sized ciphertext in the standard model. The size of the public
key and the private keys of our system are both linear in the
maximum number of receivers. In addition, our system is fully
collusion-resistant and has stateless receivers. Compared with the
state-of-the-art, our scheme is well optimized for the broadcast
encryption. The computational complexity of decryption of our
scheme depends only on the number of receivers, not the
maximum number of receivers of the system. Technically, we
employ dual system encryption technique and our proposal
offers adaptive security under the general subgroup decisional
assumption. Our scheme demonstrates that the adaptive security
of the schemes utilizing a composite order group can be proven
under the general subgroup decisional assumption, while many
existing systems working in a composite order group are secure
under multiple subgroup decision assumptions. We note that this
finding is of an independent interest, which may be useful in other
scenarios.
Index Terms— Cryptography, public key, broadcast
encryption, identity-based broadcast encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
BROADCAST encryption (BE) [1] is a cryptographicprimitive in which multiple receivers share encrypted data
with a sender. In BE, a sender chooses the set of receivers,
adaptively, and encrypts secret data for them. The encrypted
data only can be decrypted by recipients included in the
set of receivers. BE has many practical applications such
as secure databases and Digital Right Management (DRM)
systems including DVD and Pay TV solutions.
The security of BE is defined by the security model it
follows. A BE scheme is adaptive secure [2] if it allows the
adversary to declare the set that he/she wants to attack by
using the public parameters and private keys compromised
under the restriction that the adversary cannot possess any
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decryption key of the users in the target set. The selective
security [3], by comparison, requires that the adversary to
decide the target set before the system parameters are chosen.
Selective security is a weaker notion but it is relatively easier to
achieve.
Broadcast encryption was extended to identity-based broad-
cast encryption (IBBE) [4], [5] in which each receiver is
identified by his/her unique identity as in an identity-based
encryption (IBE) [6]. As identities are arbitrary bit-strings, an
IBBE should support exponentially many users as potential
receivers. This implies that for an IBBE to be practical, the
size of parameters such as public parameters, private keys and
ciphertexts must not be related to the total number of users in
the system.
IBBE is often simplified to mID-KEM (multiple identity-
based key encryption scheme) [7], [8] which is the cryp-
tographic primitive combining identity-based encryption and
mKEM (multiple-receiver key encapsulation Mechanism).
In mID-KEM [9] and mKEM, multiple parties share a secret
key for their future secure communications to be protected by
symmetric cryptographic algorithms.
A trivial solution to broadcast is to encrypt the same
message under each receiver’s public key. However, this trivial
solution possesses a ciphertext size linear with the number
of receivers. Thus, the goal of broadcast encryption is to
reduce the size. Although there are several realizations in
broadcast encryption allowing polynomial users in the system
of the ciphertext, achieving an IBBE scheme having efficient
sized parameters remains a difficult problem because it has
to support exponentially many users in the system using the
limited entropy provided in public parameters.
An IBBE should satisfy several important properties. First,
an IBBE scheme should be fully collusion resistant [10], [11].
This property requires that even if all the users collude, they
should not be able to learn anything about the message if
none of the colluding users is included in the set of receivers
for the broadcast. The stateless receivers [12] property is
also important for the efficiency of the system. If an IBBE
scheme does not have stateless receivers, it must distribute
private keys again whenever there is a change in the set of
receivers.
In this paper, we introduce an adaptively secure IBBE
scheme achieving a constant sized ciphertext in the standard
1556-6013 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN PREVIOUS IBBE SCHEME WITH OURS
model. Our scheme allows exponentially many users in the
system, but the maximum number of recipients in a broadcast
is defined in the system setup. Our scheme is also fully
collusion resistant and features stateless receivers. In order
to prove the adaptive security of our scheme, we use the
dual system encryption [13]–[15]. Our IBBE scheme achieves
a constant sized ciphertext assuming only General Subgroup
Decision (GSD) Assumption [16], which is static and simple.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Several existing broadcast encryption schemes [3], [13],
[17], [18] achieve constant-sized ciphertext. While they are
secure in the standard model, these schemes support only
polynomially many users because they have parameters, such
as public keys or private keys, which increase linearly with
the number of total users in the system. In these systems, the
users are normally labelled from 1 to n.
Gentry and Waters [2] suggested the first adaptively secure
identity-based scheme having sub-linear sized ciphertext. First,
they introduced an IBBE scheme in which a linear sized T ag
is included in the ciphertext to allow exponentially many users
in the system. Subsequently, they suggested a way to achieve
sub-linear sized ciphertext by reusing T ag in the original
scheme and increasing the size of other components in a
ciphertext from constant to sublinear.
Lewko, Sahai and Waters [19] introduced a revocation
scheme based on a revocation system [12], [20] which achieves
broadcast encryption not by including users but by revoking
users. The size of the parameters does not depend on the
total number of users in the system. However, the size of
the ciphertext linearly increases with the number of revoked
users in their scheme. In addition, while its parameters do not
depend on the total number of users in the system, adaptive
security has been proved when it allows a polynomial number
of users. The system can only be proven selective secure if
exponentially many users are to be supported.
Similarly, an adaptively secure Key Policy Attribute
Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme featuring constant-sized
ciphertext and supporting exponentially-many attributes was
introduced by Attrapadung [21]. As broadcast encryption is a
special case of a KP-ABE of which the policy consists only
of OR-gates, their scheme is also relevant to our discussion.
We analyze this scheme when it works as a broadcast encryp-
tion scheme, and we find that our scheme is more efficient
than this scheme. The size of the ciphertext and the number of
pairing computations for the decryption of our scheme are two
thirds of theirs. Also, the security of their scheme depends on
some q-type assumptions while our scheme depends on some
simple assumptions.
There are three IBBE systems using multilinear map [22].
Due to the properties of multi-linear map, they can be very
efficient. However, although the number of the group elements
of a ciphertext is constant, the size of the group elements is
O(log2 N). Also, the security of these systems depends on
some q-type assumptions, which is undesirable.
Attrapadung and Libert [23] introduced the first IBBE
scheme having a constant sized ciphertext as an application of
Inner Product ncryption (IPE). Since broadcast encryption
can be interpreted as a special case having only OR-gates
between recipients, broadcast encryption can be also achieved
by IPE. Their scheme is constructed in a prime order group
and has a constant sized ciphertext although the sizes of a
private key and a public parameter of their scheme linearly
increase with the size of maximum number of receivers in the
system. To achieve this, they used the dual system encryption.
Their scheme depends on standard assumptions (hardness of
the Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) and the Decision Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)). However, their scheme is
designed for IPE and is not well adapted for an IBBE system.
Some important features are missing in their construction
arising from this matter. The security of their system fails
if only one receiver is included in a ciphertext because their
n-wise independence argument does not hold. Also, their
computataional complexity can be reduced if IPE is used
to construct IBBE. They also achieved an adaptively secure
broadcast encryption scheme by applying the dual system
encryption to [24]. However, this scheme requires a subgroup
decisional assumption, which cannot be reduced as General
Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption.
We compare our scheme with the existing schemes, and
the result is summarized in Table I. We note that we also
use IPE for IBBE as in [23]. Nevertheless, we optimize the
IPE scheme to support IBBE. Hence, in addition to a constant
sized ciphertext, the computational complexity of our scheme
only depends on the number of receivers for a broadcast. Also,
we observe that there exists a possible failure in the security
if only one receiver is included in a encryption. We provide
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our system depends only on GSD assumption. As a result,
our adaptively secure IBBE features low cost decryption by
achieving a constant sized ciphertext and low computational
complexity for the decryption process. More importantly, our
decryption algorithm only depends on the number of receivers
of the ciphertext, instead of the maximum number of receivers,
which is part of the system parameters. This offers a big
advantage in comparison to the other schemes.
A. Our Technique
The traditional way to prove the security of broadcast
encryption is using q-type assumptions and partitioning
the key space by the set of identities of receivers and
others [2], [3]. The dual system encryption [13], introduced by
Waters, gives a break-through in security proof methodology
by introducing the concept of semi-functional keys and cipher-
text which are only used in the security proof. However,
proving the invariance between a semi-functional key and a
normal key is still challenging because the simulator can detect
this correlation by generating a semi-functional ciphertext
which can be decrypted only by a normal key to distinguish
whether the key is a semi-functional key or a normal key.
Dual system encryption is used widely to provide security
protocols including BE [13], [19], [25], [26].
Lewko and Waters [14] suggested a way to solve this
problem. In their suggestion, when the algorithm generates
a semi-functional ciphertext, the ciphertext is correlated with
semi-functional keys. This means if a valid semi-functional
key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the semi-
functional key does not hinder decryption and works like a
normal key, but this correlation between the semi-functional
key and ciphertext is hidden to the adversary who cannot query
a valid key for the challenge ciphertext.
Although the nominally semi-functionality is very helpful
to prove the security, hiding the correlation is not trivial if the
system has to support exponentially many users with limited
entropy. Lewko and Waters [27] introduced the technique to
overcome the shortage of randomness. To amplify the entropy,
they localize semi-functional spaces by introducing ephemeral
semi-functional space which is only used to prove the key
invariance between a normal key and a semi-functional key.
The random values, hiding the correlation between the key and
the ciphertext, are only used in ephemeral semi-functional
space. Then, the semi-functional spaces share only random
values which do not interrupt to hide this correlation in
ephemeral semi-functional space.
We prove the security of our scheme similarly with [27].
However, we prove the adaptive security of our system using
General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16] only.
Specifically, in [27], when they proved the semi-functional
invariance of their scheme, they used an assumption which
cannot be reduced to GSD. In contrast, we prove semi-
functional invariance without this assumption. Hence, the
security of our scheme relies on fewer assumptions than
Lewko and Waters’ scheme [27].
Our IBBE scheme achieves adaptive security by com-
bining dual system encryption [13] with n-wise pairwise
independence argument [23], However, the n-wise indepen-
dence argument does not hold if only one receiver is included
in the system. Hence, first we restrict our scheme so that
the number of receivers is larger than 1. Then, we provide a
practical way to overcome this restriction. The computational
complexity of the decryption algorithm of our scheme only
depends on the number of receivers.
B. Broadcast Encryption Systems
Our broadcast encryption scheme consists of four
algorithms, namely, setup (Setup), private key generation
(KeyGen), encryption (Enc) and decryption (Dec) as defined
below.
Setup(λ, n, ) takes as input the number of receivers (n) and
the maximal size of a broadcast recipient group ( (≤ n)).
It outputs a public/master secret key pair 〈P K ,M SK 〉.
KeyGen(i , M SK ) takes as input an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
the secret key MSK. It outputs a private key di .
Enc(S, M , P K ) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
a message M and a public key P K . If |S| ≤ , it outputs
a CT .
Dec(S, i , di , CT , P K ) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a private key di for i , a
ciphertext CT, and the public key P K . If |S| ≤  and
i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs the message M.
Correctness For the correctness, the following property
must be satisfied.
For S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} where |S| ≤  ≤ n, let
(P K ,M SK ) ← Setup(λ, n, ), di ← K eyGen(i,M SK )
for i ∈ [1, n] and CT ← Enc(S,M, P K ). Then, if i ∈ S,
Dec(S, i, di ,CT, P K ) = M .
It should be noted that the definition of BE above is general
enough to describe IBBE.
C. Security Definition
We define the adaptive security model of IBBE. This
basically follows the adaptive security model of [2]. The
only difference being we adapt it for an ordinary IBBE
scheme while the adaptive security model of [2] is for a key
encapsulation scheme.
Both the adversary and the challenger are given as
input  and n, i.e., the maximal size of a set of receivers S
and the maximum users in a system, respectively.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(λ, n, ) to obtain a public
key PK. It gives A the public key PK.
Phase I: The adversary A adaptively issues private queries
for identities i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Challenge: If Phase I is over, The attacker declares two
equal length message M0 and M1 and a challenge set
S∗ where S∗ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and the identities of S∗ never
have been queried in Phase I. If |S∗| is larger than , it
outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the challenger randomly selects
b ← {0, 1} and runs encryption algorithm to obtain
CT = Enc(S∗,Mb ,P K ). The challenger returns CT to A.
Phase II: The adversary A adaptively issues private
queries as Phase I except that added restriction that
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Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b′.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in attacking
the identity based broadcast encryption system IBBE with
inputs (n, , λ):
AdvA,IBBE,n,(λ) := |Pr [b = b′] − 1/2|
We define that an identity based encryption system IBBE is
adaptively secure if AdvA,IBBE,n,(λ) = ε is negligible for
all PPT algorithms A.
D. Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We briefly describe the important properties of composite
order bilinear groups which were introduced in [28]. Let G be
a group generation algorithm taking a security parameter λ as
input and outputting a description of a bilinear group G. For
our purposes, we will have G output (p1, p2, p3, G, GT , e)
where p1, p2, p3 are distinct primes, G and GT are cyclic
groups of order N = p1 p2 p3, and e : G2 → GT is a map
such that:
1. (Bilinear) ∀g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZN , e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab
2. (Non-degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order N
in GT .
We assume that the group operations in G in GT as well as
the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time with
respect to λ and that the group descriptions of G and GT
include generators of the respective cyclic groups. We let
G p1 , G p2 and G p3 denote the subgroup of order p1, p2
and p3 in G respectively. We note that when hi ∈ G pi
and h j ∈ G p j for i = j , e(hi , h j ) is the identity element
in GT (i.e. e(h1, h2) = 1). This orthogonal property of
G p1,G p2 ,G p3 will be used to implement semi-functionality
in our constructions.
E. Complexity Assumption
Our scheme is adaptively secure under General Subgroup
Decision (GSD) assumption [16]. To avoid duplicate state-
ments in the security proof and demonstrate which GSD
instances were used clearly, we include Assumptions 1, 2 and 3
which are special cases of GSD.
General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16]: Let
G(1λ) be a group generator and Z0, Z1, …, Zk be a collection
of non-empty subset of {1, 2, 3} where each Zi for i ≥ 2
satisfies either (1) or (2) following
Z0 ∪ Zi = ∅ and Z1 ∩ Zi = ∅ (1)
Z0 ∩ Zi = ∅ and Z1 ∩ Zi = ∅ (2)
Then, we define the following distribution:
G = (N = p1 p2 p3,G,GT , e) R←− G(1λ),
gZ2
R←− G Z2, . . . , gZk R←− G Zk
D = (G, gZ2, . . . , gZk ), T1 R←− G Z0, T2 R←− G Z1 .
With the fixed collection of sets Z0, . . . , Zk , we define the
advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
AdvGS DG,A (λ) := |Pr [A(D, T0) = 1] − Pr [A(D, T1) = 1]|.
We define three assumptions as special cases of GSD
assumption.
For each assumption, given a group generator G(1λ), we
define the following distribution:
G = (N = p1 p2 p3,G,GT , e) R←− G(1λ),
Assumption 1 (A Special Case of GSD Assumption With
Z0 = {1, 2} Z1 = {1}):
g
R←− G p1, D = (G, g), T1 R←− G p1 p2, T2 R←− G p1
Assumption 2 (A Special Case of GSD Assumption With
Z0 = {1} Z1 = {1, 3}):
g, X1
R←− G p1, g2 R←− G p2, X3 R←− G p3
D = (G, g, g2, X1 X3), T1 R←− G p1, T2 R←− G p1 p3
Assumption 3 (A Special Case of GSD Assumption With
Z0 = {1, 3} Z1 = {1, 2, 3}):
g, X1
R←− G p1, X2, Y2 R←− G p2 , g3, Y3 R←− G p3
D = (G, g, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3), T1 R←− G p1 p3, T2 R←− G
In some lemmas, the roles of p2 and p3 of Assumption 3
are reversed.
III. OUR IBBE CONSTRUCTION
A. Construction
Let i be an identity of a user in the system, and S be a set
of identities of recipients for a broadcast. Also we define the
maximum number of receivers . We restricted the number of
receivers to be greater than 1.
• Setup(λ, , n) The setup algorithm takes in n,  and
the security parameter λ as input. Then, it chooses
a bilinear group G of order N = p1 p2 p3 where
p1, p2 and p3 are distinct primes. Then the algorithm
generates g, u, w, v, h
R←− G p1 where G pi is a subgroup
of G of order p1, and also generates randomly
M SK = {δ} in ZN . It outputs
P K = 〈g, u, w, vα j , hα j , e(g, h)δ : j ∈ [0, ]〉
• KeyGen(MSK, PK, i ) Generate yi , ri R←− ZN for identity
i , randomly and the sets X := (x, . . . , x1, x0) =
(i , . . . , i, i0). Using M SK and P K , it sets
di := 〈K0, K1, K2, K3, j : j ∈ [1, ]〉
= 〈gδwyi , hyi , v yi · uri , h(−α0 x j/x0+α j )ri : j ∈ [1, ]〉
It should be noted that x0 is fixed as i0 = 1. However,
we leave it in the definition to clarify the correctness.
• Enc(P K , M , S) First, the encryption algorithm parses S
as {i1, . . . , ik} and sets Z = (z, .., z0) where z j is
an coefficient of z j of
∏k
j=1(z − i j ). With randomly
generated s, t
R←− ZN , To output CT , it sets
CT := 〈C,C0,C1,C2,C3〉
= 〈M · e(g, h)δs, hs , wsv〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut 〉
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TABLE II
THE RECOMMENDED SIZE OF THE PARAMETERS FOR 3 PRIMES [29]
• Decrypt(S, i , di , CT , P K ) Suppose i ∈ S, and calculateZ , the decryption algorithm outputs
D = e(K0,C0)e(K2,C2)
e(K1,C1)e((K3,1)z1 · · · (K3,k)zk ,C3) = e(g, h)
δs
Then, it outputs a message M = C/D.




δwyi , hs)e(v yi uri , h〈α, Z〉t )
e(hyi , wsv〈α, Z〉t )
= e(g, h)
sδe(h, w)syi e(h, v)〈α, Z〉t yi e(h, u)tri 〈α, Z〉
e(h, w)syi e(h, v)〈α, Z〉t yi
= e(g, h)sδe(h, u)tri 〈α, Z〉




(h(z j (−α0x j /x0+α j ))ri , ut )
= e((h−α0(kj=1z j x j )/x0+kj=1z jα j )ri , ut )
= e(h(α0z0+kj=1α j z j )ri , ut )
= e(h, u)tri 〈α, Z〉
As i is a root of
∏k
j=1(z − i j ), 〈 X , Z 〉 = kj=0x j z j = 0,
this also implies that kj=1x j z j = −z0x0. Therefore,
D = E/F = e(g, h)sδ.
We restricted our scheme to have |S|. However, this can be
accommodated by reserving one identity when system sets
up and including this identity if encryption body want to
share a secret with only one user. It should be noted that the
private key for this reserved identity must not be given to
any user.
B. Choice of Parameters
The size of parameters is determined by the security level
which a broadcast system aims to achieve. In our construction,
N is the product of three primes. The factors of N must
not be revealed to the attackers. We recommend the size of
N based on the result of Guillevic [29] in Table II for achieving
equivalent security levels with AES. The sizes are calculated
based on the attacks “Number Field Sieve attack” and “Elliptic
Curve Method attack” [30]. The minimum of the size of
parameters is calculated based on the cost (time) equivalence,
while the maximum of the size of parameters is computed
based on the computational equivalence [30].
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to prove the security of our scheme, the dual
system encryption was used. The security can be proved by
the invariances of security games.
A. Security Properties for the Dual System Encryption IBBE
Before we present the security proof of our construction, we
define semi-functional keys and a semi-functional ciphertext
which are not used in the real system, but necessary in
the proof. In the definition, g2, g3 denotes generators of
G2,G3, respectively. In order to create semi-functional keys,
we generate ψ, σ
R←− ZN , first. These are shared parameters in
semi-functional keys regardless of the identity of i .
Semi-Functional Key: Let (K ′0, K ′1, K ′2, K ′3, j : j ∈ [1, ])
be a normal key generated by using the key generation
algorithm. Then, we randomly select ỹi
R←− ZN for the
identity i and define a semi-functional key as below
K0 = K ′0(g2g3)ψ ỹi , K1 = K ′1(g2g3)ỹi
K2 = K ′2(g2g3)σ ỹi , K3, j = K ′3, j : j ∈ [1, ].
Semi-Functional Ciphertext: Let C ′, C ′0, C ′1, C ′2 and C ′3
be a properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then, with
randomly generated a, b← ZN , a semi-functional key is
defined as below
C = C ′, C0 = C ′0ga2 , C1 = C ′1gb2, C2 = C ′2, C3 = C ′3
Semi-functional keys are only able to decrypt a normal
ciphertext but not a semi-functional ciphertext although normal
keys can decrypt both a normal and a semi-functional cipher-
text. Now, we will prove that no PPT algorithm distinguishes
the following security games with non-negligible advantage.
GameI B B EReal This is a real game following the adaptive secu-
rity model of IBBE. All private keys and the challenge
ciphertext are also normal.
GameI B B Ek This is identical with Game
I B B E
Real except for the
types of private keys and a ciphertext. In this game, the
first k keys are semi-functional keys, and the rest of
the keys are normal keys and the challenge ciphertext is
semi-functional.
GameI B B EFinal′ This is identical with Game
I B B E
q where q is the
total number of key queries besides the private keys.
In this game, random elements from G p3 are added to K2,
K3,1, . . . K3, components of all semi-functional keys.
GameI B B EFinal′′ This is identical with Game
I B B E
Final′ besides the
challenge ciphertext. In this game, the challenge cipher-
text is similar to the semi-functional ciphertext, but all
components except C have additional random elements
from from G p3 .
GameI B B EFinal This is identical with Game
I B B E
Final′′ besides the
challenge ciphertext. In this game, the first component
C of the challenge ciphertext is replaced by a random
element from GT .
Theorem 1: Our IBBE system is adaptively secure under
General Subgroup Decision Assumption.
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Lemma 1 (Semi-Functional Ciphertext Invariance): Suppose
there exists a polynomial time algorithm A such that
GameI B B EReal AdvA − GameI B B E0 AdvA = ε. Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 1.
Proof: B is given g1, T . It will simulate GameI B B EReal
or GameI B B E0 with A. It chooses random exponents
yu, yw, yv , yh, α0, . . . , α, δ ∈ ZN , and sets g = g1,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = gyh1 . It publishes the public
parameters:
P K = (g, u, w, vα j , hα j , e(g, h)δ : j ∈ [0, ])
Also, B generates normal keys by the key generation algorithm
because it knows both P K and M SK .
In the challenge, A sends B two messages M0,M1 and
the set of receivers, S. To make the challenge ciphertext,
B calculates Z = (z, .., z0) where z j is an coefficient of z j
of
∏k
j=1(z−i j ), and implicitly sets gs1 to be the G p1 part of T
(this means that T is the product of gs1 ∈ G p1 and possibly an
element of G p2 ). B also generates t ∈ ZN randomly. It chooses
f ∈ {0, 1} by flipping a coin and sets:
C = M f e(gδ, T yh ), C0 = T yh , C1 = T ywgyv 〈α, Z〉t ,
C2 = gyh〈α, Z〉t1 , C3 = gyut1 .
If T ∈ G p1 , this is properly distributed normal ciphertext,
and B properly simulates the GameI B B EReal . If T ∈ G p1 p2 ,
then we have a semi-functional ciphertext with a = yhs′ and
b = yws′: we denote the G p2 part of T by gs
′
2 (i.e. T = gs1gs
′
2 ).
Since the values of yh, and yw modulo p2 are uncorrelated
from their values modulo p1, reusing the values from G p1
does not correlate with the normal key. So, this is a properly
distributed semi-functional ciphertext, and B properly
simulates GameI B B E0 . 
Lemma 2 (Semi-Functional Security): Suppose there exists
a polynomial time algorithm A such that GameI B B Eq AdvA−
GameI B B EFinal AdvA = ε. Then we can construct a polynomial
time algorithm B with advantage ε in breaking Assumption 2
or Assumption 3.
Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 2.1 to 2.3. 
Lemma 2.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that GameI B B Eq AdvA−GameI B B EFinal′ AdvA = ε.
Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage ε in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate
GameI B B Eq or Game
I B B E
Final′ with A. It chooses random
exponents yg, yu, yw, yv, α0, . . . , α, δ ∈ ZN , and sets
g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It publishes
the public parameters:
P K = (g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , e(g, h)δ : j ∈ [0, ])
When A makes a ciphertext query by sending two messages
M0, M1 and the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by
choosing random t, s, a, b ∈ ZN . Then, it randomly selects
f ∈ {0, 1} and returns
C = M f e(g, h)δs,C0 = hs ga2 ,
C1 = ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t , C2 = h〈α, Z〉t , C3 = ut }.
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , A
chooses a random y ′i , r ′i ∈ ZN and returns
{(X1 X3g2)yw y′i , (X1 X3g2)y′i ,
(X1 X3g2)
yv y′i T yur
′
i , T r
′





2 denote X1 X3. Then, yi equals to yx1 y
′
i modulo
p1 and ỹi equals to y ′i modulo p2 and yx3 y ′i modulo p3. Also,
ri equals to tr ′i modulo p1 if we write the G p1 of T as gt1.
Also it impicitly sets that ψ = yw and σ = yv modulo p2, p3.
If T ∈ G p1 , this has simulated GameI B B Eq , properly. Also,
If T ∈ G p1 p3 , because yu and a j modulo p3 do not appear
anywhere else, the random elements of G p3 are added in
K2 and K3, j to each key and randomized by r ′i . Hence, this
has well simulated GameI B B EFinal′ . 
Lemma 2.2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that GameI B B EFinal′ AdvA−GameI B B EFinal′′ AdvA = ε.
Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage ε in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2, T . It will simulate
GameI B B EFinal′ or Game
I B B E
Final′′ with A. It chooses random expo-
nents yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, δ, ψ, σ ∈ ZN , and sets
g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It publishes
the public parameters:
P K = (g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , e(g, h)δ)
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , B
chooses a random yi , r ′i , γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and it returns
K0 = (X1 X2)yw y′i gψy
′
i
3 , K1 = (X1 X2g3)y
′
i ,











2 denote X1 X2. Then, yi equals to yx1 y
′
i modulo
p1 and ỹi equals to yx2 y
′
i modulo p2 and y
′
i modulo p3.
So, these are properly distributed semi-functional keys.
When A makes a ciphertext query by sending M0, M1 and
the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random
t ′, t ′′, t ′′′ ∈ ZN Then, it randomly selects f ∈ {0, 1} and
returns
C = M f e(g, T )δ,C0 = T ga2 ,
C1 = T ywgb2 T yv 〈α, Z〉t
′′′
v〈α, Z〉t ′,
C2 = T 〈α, Z〉t ′′′h〈α, Z〉t ′, C3 = T yut ′′′gyut ′ .
We denote the G p1 part of T as g
τ
1 . This implicitly sets s = τ
and t = t ′ + τ t ′′′ modulo p1.
If T ∈ G p1 , this B has properly simulated GameI B B EFinal′ .
If T ∈ G p1 p3 , we must argue that the G3 terms attached to
the ciphertext are uniformly random in order to claim that
B simulates properly GameI B B EFinal′′ . Let us denote by G3 the






3 . If we also denote by G3
the part of T as gτ
′′
3 , then t0 = τ ′′, t1 = τ ′′(yw+ yv〈α, Z〉t ′′′),
t2 = τ ′′(〈α, Z 〉t ′′′) and t3 = τ ′′(yut ′′′) modulo p3. Because
α j 〉, yw, yv , yu do not appears any G p3 parts in this simulation.
So, the G3 parts of the challenge ciphertext are randomly
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Lemma 2.3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that GameI B B EFinal′′ AdvA −
GameI B B EFinal AdvA = ε. Then we can construct a polynomial
time algorithm B with advantage ε in breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will simu-
late GameI B B EFinal′′ or Game
I B B E
Final using A. It chooses random
exponents yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 and h = g1. It publishes the
public parameters:
P K = (g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , e(T yg , g1))
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , B
chooses a random y ′i , r ′i , γ ′0, . . . γ ′ ∈ ZN and returns
K0 = T (yw+yg)wy′i (Y2Y3)(yw+yg)y′i , K1 = T hy′i (Y2Y3)y′i ,




K3, j = hri (−α0x j /x0+α j )griγ
′
j
3 : j ∈ [1, ]







3 , respectively, this implicitly sets yi = δ+ y ′i modulo p1.
Also, ỹ ′i equals to yy3 y ′i+δ′′ modulo p3. ψ = yw+ yg modulo
p2 and p3, and σ = yv modulo p2 and p3. If T ∈ G p1 p3 , ỹ ′i
equals to yy2 y
′
i modulo p2. If T ∈ G, ỹ ′i equals to yy3 y ′i + δ′
modulo p2 if we write the G p2 part of T as g
δ′
2 .
When A makes a ciphertext query by sending M0, M1 and
the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random
a′, b′, s′, t ∈ ZN and returning
C = e(T yg , X1 X2)s ′,C0 = (X1 X2)s ′(Y2Y3)a′,
C1 = (X1 X2)yws ′(Y2Y3)b′v〈α, Z〉t,
C2 = h〈α, Z〉t gt ′3 , C3 = ut gt
′′
3
The random values are properly added into the G p2 p3 part
of the ciphertext because of a′, b′, t ′, t ′′. If T ∈ G p1 p3 , this
properly simulated GameI B B EFinal′′ . If T ∈ G, e(g2, g2)δ
′yx2 s
′
additionally added to C of the ciphertext. It should be noted
that the value of s′ modulo p2 appears C0 and C1 in the
ciphertext, but its value is not revealed because of a′ and b′
modulo p2. Hence, e(g2, g2)δ
′yx2 s
′
is uniformly random to A,
and this has well simulated GameI B B EFinal . 
B. Semi-Functional Key Invariance
It is quite challenging to prove that there is no polynomial
time algorithm B to distinguish between GameI B B Ek−1 and
GameI B B Ek with non-negligible advantage because there is
no restriction on B. Hence it can generate a semi-functional
ciphertext to test whether the kth key is semi-functional or
normal by decrypting the semi-functional ciphertext using
the kth key. In order to avoid this potential paradox, we
designed oracles which output the challenge ciphertext and the
private key unless the identities of the keys requested do not
belong to the set of the recipients’ identities of the challenge
ciphertext. However, constructing these oracles and proving
the invariance between them is still challenging when we
work with exponentially many users because we often have to
amplifying the randomness of system with the limited entropy
of public keys. Hence, we defined additionally ephemeral key
and ciphertext which are similar with the ephemeral
semi-functional key and ciphertext introduced in [27].
In this setting, an ephemeral key decrypts both a normal
and a semi-functional ciphertext, but an ephemeral challenge
ciphertext is decrypted only by a normal key.
Ephemeral key: Let K ′0, K ′1, K ′2, and K ′3, j be a normal key
generated by using the key generation algorithm. With
random γ0, γ1, . . . γ
R←− ZN
K0 = K ′0, K1 = K ′1, K2 = K ′2(g2g3)γ0,
K3, j = K ′3, j (g2g3)γ j : j ∈ [1, ]
Ephemeral ciphertext: Let C ′, C ′0, C ′1, C ′2 and C ′3 be a
properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then with random
a, b, α′0, . . . , α′k, t ′, t ′′
R←− ZN , and outputs
C = C ′, C0 = C ′0ga2 ,
C1 = C ′1gb2 gσ 〈α
′, Z〉t ′
2 , C2 = C ′2g〈α
′, Z〉t ′
2 , C3 = C ′3gt
′′
2
where α′ = (α′0,..α′k).
It should be noted that an ephemeral ciphertext has the
parameter σ shared with the semi-functional key.
1) Sequence of Games: In order to prove the invariance
between GameI B B Ek−1 and GameI B B Ek , we additionally define
security games having an ephemeral key and/or an ephemeral
ciphertext and the added restriction in modulo p3.
GameI B B E
′
k−1 This game is identical with GameI B B Ek−1 , except
for the added restriction that the identity of the (k-1)th key
cannot be equal to any of the identities of the challenge
ciphertext modulo p3.
GameE Kk In this game, the ciphertext is semi-functional and
the kth key is ephemeral. The additional restriction on
the identities modulo p3 is retained in this game.
GameECk In this game, both the ciphertext the k
th key are
ephemeral. The additional restriction on the identities
modulo p3 is retained in this game.
GameI B B E
′
k This game is identical with Game
I B B E
k , except
for the additional restriction on the identities modulo p3.
First, we will prove that GameI B B Ek ≈ GameI B B E
′
k . Then,
the steps GameI B B E
′
k−1 ≈ GameE Kk , GameE Kk ≈ GameECk ,
GameECk ≈ GameI B B E
′
k and Game
I B B E ′
k ≈ GameI B B Ek will
be followed.
Lemma 3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm
A such that GameI B B Ek AdvA − GameI B B E
′
k AdvA = ε.
Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage ε in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.
Proof: We suppose there exists a PPT attacker A
that distinguishes between GameI B B Ek and Game
I B B E ′
k with
non-negligible advantage. Because A has non-negligible
advantage, it produces two values I,I ′ ∈ ZN which satisfy
I = I ′ modulo N but I = I ′ modulo p3 with non-negligible
probability while it is simulating GameI B B Ek . We set A as the
g.c.d of I − I ′ and N and B as N/A. Then, p3 is divisible
by A, and B = 1. There are two possible cases: 1) p1 is
divisible by B and 2) A = p1 p3, B = p2. The rest of the
proof can be described as the same manner of [14] and [27].
The case 1 can be used to break Assumption 2, and the case 2






8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
TABLE III
THE SUMMARY OF ORACLES
2) Oracle Lemmas: The invariance between GameI B B E
′
k−1
and GameI B B E
′
k will be proved by using the oracle lemmas.
In the following proofs, B uses oracles to simulate the security
games with A, but it cannot distinguish which oracles with
which it is working. We define four oracles (O0, O1, O2, O3).
Each oracle can response to an initial query, a challenge
key query and a challenge ciphertext query. We summarize
the relation between the oracles and the security games
in Table III.
In order to respond to an initial query, the oracles randomly
select g, u, w, v, h ∈ G p1 and α0, . . . , α, s, a, ψ, ỹ, y,
σ ∈ ZN and return the group elements:




σ ỹ : j ∈ [0, ]}.
The responses that each oracle outputs as a challenge key and
a challenge ciphertext have different distributions according
to the type of oracle. They are distributed as the following:
Oracle O0: If the oracle receives a challenge key query
for an identity i ∈ ZN , it returns the group elements which
are identical with a normal key. Upon receiving a challenge
ciphertext query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it
calculates Z for S and selects randomly b, t R←− ZN , then
returns the group elements
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut }.
Oracle O1: If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an
identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′
R←− ZN ,
then returns the group elements
{wy′ , hy′, v y′ur ′ (g2g3)γ ′0,
h(−α0x j /x0+α j )r ′(g2g3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
The challenge ciphertext response is identical with O0.
Oracle O2: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext
query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it calculates Z
for S and selects randomly b, t, α′0, . . . , α′, t1, t2
R←− ZN , then
returns the group elements







It responses to a challenge key query in the same way as O1.
Oracle O3: If the oracle receives a challenge key query for
an identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, ỹ ′, r ′ R←− ZN , then
returns the group elements
{wy′(g2g3)ψ ỹ′, hy′(g2g3)ỹ′, v y′(g2g3)σ ỹ′ur ′,
h(−α0x j /x0+α j )r ′ : j ∈ [1, ]}
The challenge ciphertext response is identical with O0.
The invariances of (O0, O1, O2, O3) are proved by
TABLE IV
THE SUMMARY OF HOPS
several lemmas with additionally defined sub-oracles.
For the overview of proving sequences, we add Table IV.
Lemma 4: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O0 AdvA − O1 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.
Proof: This is proved by Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 with
an additional oracle O0.1.
Oracle O0.1: If the oracle receives a challenge key query for
an identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . γ ′
R←− ZN ,
then returns the group elements




3 : j ∈ [1, ]}.
It responses to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O0. 
Lemma 4.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O0 AdvA − O0.1 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate
O0 or O0.1 using A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, ỹ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends the group elements to A:
(g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , hs ga2 ,
(X1 X3)
ywgyw ỹ2 , (X1 X3)g
ỹ
2 , (X1 X3)
yv gyv ỹ2 : j ∈ [0, ])




3 , this implicitly sets y equal to yx1
modulo p1 and ỹ equal to yx3 modulo p3. Also, ψ equals yw
and σ equals yv modulo p2 and p3. Because the values of yw
and yv modulo p1 do not correlate with their values in modulo
p2 and p3, this is properly distributed.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
receivers, S∗, B chooses a random b, t ∈ ZN and returns the
group elements
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut }.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′ ∈ ZN and returns
{wy′ , hy′, v y′T yu , T−α0x j /x0+α j : j ∈ [1, ]}.
This implicitly sets gr
′
1 to be the G p1 part of T . If T ∈ G p1 ,
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then this matches the distribution of O0.1. Also this implicitly
sets α′j = α j , γ ′0 = r ′′yu and γ ′j = r ′′(−α0x j/x0+α j ) modulo





modulo p3 which does not appear anywhere else. Also, for
all j ∈ [1, ], γ ′j contains α j modulo p3 which also does
not appear anywhere else. Because yu modulo p3 and α j
modulo p3 are not correlated with their values in modulo p1,
this challenge ciphertext is randomly distributed. 
Lemma 4.2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O0.1 AdvA − O1 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will simulate
O0.1 or O1 using A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, ψ, y, ỹ, σ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , and h = g1. It sends the group
elements to A:




σ ỹ : j ∈ [1, ])
This is implicitly sets a = yx2 modulo p2 when we
write X1 X2 = gs1g
yx2
2 .
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
recivers, S, B responds to A by choosing a random t ∈ ZN
and returning
{(X1 X2)yw, v〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut }.
This implies b = ywyx2 modulo p2. a and b are uniformly
distributed because yw modulo p2 does not appear anywhere
else.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some iden-
tity i , A chooses a random y ′ ∈ ZN and returns
{wy′, hy′, v y′T yu , T−α0 x j/x0+α j : j ∈ [1, ]}.
The G1 part of the challenge ciphertext is properly distributed
if we write gr
′
1 as the G1 part of T . If we write the G p3
part of T as gr
′′
3 , this implicitly sets γ
′
0 = r ′′yu modulo p3
and γ ′j = r ′′(−α0x j/x0 + α j ) modulo p3. Because yu and
α j modulo p3 do not appear anywhere else, the G p3 parts
of this challenge ciphertext is randomly distributed. Hence,
if T ∈ G p1 p3 , then this matches the distribution of O0.1.
If T ∈ G, then this matches the distribution of O1 because
yu and α j modulo p2 do not appear anywhere else and does
not correlate their values in modulo p1 and p3, this is the
properly distributed challenge ciphertext. 
Lemma 5: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O1 AdvA − O2 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.
Proof: This is proved by Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and
Lemma 5.3 with additional oracles O1.1 and O1.2.
Oracle O1.1: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext
query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
b, t, α′0, . . . , α′, t1, t2
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements







It responses an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O1.
Oracle O1.2: If the oracle receives a challenge cipher-
text query for an identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly
b, t, α′0, . . . , α′, t1, t2
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t (g2g3)σ 〈α
′, Z〉t1,
h〈α, Z〉t (g2g3)〈α
′, Z〉t1, ut (g2g3)t2}
It responses an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O1.1. 
Lemma 5.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O1 AdvA − O1.1 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate O1
or O1.1 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yw, yv ,
yh, σ ′, α0, . . . , α, s, a, ỹ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends the group
elements to A:




2 , (X1 X3)
yv gσ
′ ỹ
2 : j ∈ [0, ])




3 . Then, this implicitly sets
y equals to yx1 modulo p1. Also, ψ equal to yw sets σ equal
to σ ′ modulo p2 and yv modulo p3.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some iden-
tity i , A chooses a random y ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and returns





r ′(−α0x j /x0+α j )g
γ ′j
2 : j ∈ [1, ]}
This implies that γ ′0 = r ′yu yx3 modulo p3 and
γ ′j = r ′(−α0x j/x0 + α j )yx3 modulo p3.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
recivers, S, B responds to A by returning
{ws gb2 T yv 〈α, Z〉, T 〈α, Z〉, T yu }.
This implicitly sets gt to be the G p1 part of T . If T ∈ G p1 ,
then this matches the distribution of O1 because yu, α j of
G p3 part of the challenge key does not appear anywhere
else. However, if T ∈ G p1 p3 , α j modulo p3 for j ∈ [0, ]
also appears in the challenge ciphertext. We must argue
−α0x j/x0+α j modulo p3 for j ∈ [1, ] are uniformly random
even if 〈α, Z〉 modulo p3 for j ∈ [0, ] is given: Let α′j = α j
modulo p3 for all j ∈ [0, ]. Then, we rewrite the relations




























































Because α′j modulo p3 is uniformly random and does not
correlate their values with those in modulo p1 by CRT, γ ′j for
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This implies that γ ′1, . . . , γ ′k are 〈α′, Z〉 are uniformly
distributed. It should be noted that if k = 1, γ ′1 is equal to
〈α′, Z 〉 because z0 equal to −x1/x0 and z1 = 1. Also, we
stress that γ ′k+1, . . . γ ′ given to the adversary shares the α′0,
but the value of α′0 is not revealed because for all j ∈ [k+1, ],
γ ′j has α j which does not appear anywhere else. 
Lemma 5.2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O1.1 AdvA−O1.2 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will simulate
O1.1 or O1.2 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, ψ, y, ỹ, σ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , and h = g1. It sends the group
elements to A:




yv ỹ : j ∈ [0, ])




When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and
returns
{wy′, hy′ , v y′ur ′(Y2Y3)γ ′0,
hr
′(−α0x j /x0+α j )(Y2Y3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers,
S, B responds to A by returning
{(X1 X2)ywT yv 〈α, Z〉, T 〈α, Z〉, T yu }.
This implies b = ywyx2 . a and b modulo p2 are uniformly
distributed because yw modulo p2 do not appear anywhere
else.
If T ∈ G, then this matches the distribution of O1.2. If we
write (g2g3)t
′
to be the G p2 p3 part of T ., then this implies
that t1 = t ′, t2 = t ′yu and α′j = α j modulo p2 and p3
for j ∈ [0, ]. Because α j , yu modulo p2 and p3 do not
appear anywhere else, these are properly distributed. Similarly,
If T ∈ G p1 p3 , then this matches the distribution of O1.1. 
Lemma 5.3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O1.2 AdvA − O2 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simu-
late O1.2 or O2 with A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, y2 ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = g1, w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. Then, the responses
of the initial and challenge-key queries can be generated the
same way as Lemma 5.1.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
receivers, S, B randomly selects s, b, α0, . . . , α, t1, t2 and
responds to A by returning





2 , T g
t2
2 }.
This is possible because g2 was given. If we denote gt to be
the G p1 part of T, the G p1 part of the challenge ciphertext
is properly distributed. If T ∈ G p1 , then this matches the
distribution of O2. If T ∈ G p1 p3 , this matches the distribution
of O1.2 for the same reasons as for Lemma 5.1. 
Lemma 6: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O2 AdvA − O3 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.
Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 6.1 to 6.9 with
additional oracles Oracle O2.1, Oracle O2.2, Oracle O2.3,
Oracle O2.4, Oracle O2.5, Oracle O2.6, Oracle O2.7 and
Oracle O2.8.
Oracle O2.1: If the oracle receives a challenge key query
for an identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, ỹ ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . ,
γ ′
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements












′(−α0x j /x0+α j )(g2g3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
It responses to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O2.
Oracle O2.2: The response for an initial query is identical
with that of O2.1 except that hs(g2g3)a replaces hs ga2 .
If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for
a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
b, α′0, . . . , α′, t, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5
R←− ZN , then returns the group
elements













It responses to a challenge ciphertext query in the same way
as O2.1.
Oracle O2.3: If the oracle receives a challenge key query
for identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, ỹ ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . ,
γ ′
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements
{wy′(g2g3)ψ ỹ′, hy′(g2g3)ỹ′, v y′ur ′(g2g3)γ ′0+σ ỹ′,
hr
′(−α0x j /x0+α j )(g2g3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O2.2.
Oracle O2.4: The response for an initial query is identical
with that of O2.1.
If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for
a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
s, b, α′0, . . . , α′, t, t1, t2
R←− ZN , then returns the group
elements







It responds to a challenge ciphertext query in the same way
as O2.3.
Oracle O2.5: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext
query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
s, b, α′0, . . . , α′, t, t1, t2, t3, t4
R←− ZN , then returns the group
elements













It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
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Oracle O2.6: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext
query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
s, b, t, t3, t4
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t gσ t33 , h〈α, Z〉t gt33 , ut gt43 }
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O2.5.
Oracle O2.7: If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext
query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
s, b, t
R←− ZN , then returns the group elements
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut }
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O2.6.
Oracle O2.8: If the oracle receives a challenge key query
for an identity i ∈ ZN , it selects randomly y ′, ỹ ′, r ′, γ ′′,
γ ′′′ R←− ZN , then returns the group elements





′(−α0 x j/x0+α j )g
γ ′j
3 : j ∈ [1, ]}
It responds to an initial query and a challenge ciphertext query
in the same way as O2.7. 
Lemma 6.1: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O2 AdvA − O2.1 AdvA = ε. Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate
O2 or O2.1 with A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, ỹ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , and h = g1. It sends the group
elements to A:
(g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , hs ga2 ,
(X1 X3)
ywgyw ỹ2 , (X1 X3)g
ỹ
2 , (X1 X3)
yv gyv ỹ2 : j ∈ [1, ])
This implicitly sets gy1 = X1 modulo p1. Also, ψ equals yw
and σ equals yv modulo p2, p3.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set
of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random
b, t, α′0, . . . , α′, t1, t2 ∈ ZN and returning







where α′ = (α′0, . . . , α′).
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random γ ∈ ZN and returns




−α0x j /x0+α j : j ∈ [1, − 1]}
If we denote X1 X3 = gyx11 g
yx3
3 , this implicitly sets r
′ = yx1
modulo p1. We note γ ′0 = γ yu modulo p2 and γ ′0 = yx3 yu
modulo p3, also γ ′j = γ (−α0x j/x0 + α j ) modulo p2 and
γ ′j = yx3(−α0x j/x0 + α j ) modulo p3.
Let T ∈ G p1 and gy
′
1 be the G p1 part of T , then this matches
the distribution of O2. If T ∈ G p1 p3 (g1g3)y′ is the G p1 p3
part of T , then this matches the distribution of O2.1 because
yu and α0, . . . α modulo p2 do not appear anywhere else. 
Lemma 6.2: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O2.1 AdvA−O2.2 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: In this lemma G p2 and G p3 parts of Assumption 3
are reversed. B is given g1, g2, X1 X3,Y2Y3, T . It will simulate
O2.1 or O2.2 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, y, σ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends the group elements to A:




σ : j ∈ [1, ])
This is properly distributed if we denote the G p1 part of T
by gs1. Also, this sets ψ = yw modulo p2, p3. If T ∈ G p1 p2 ,
this is a properly distributed set of group elements of O2.1.
If T ∈ G, this is properly distributed set of group elements
of O2.2.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some iden-
tity i , A chooses a random r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and it returns
{(X1 X3)yw, (X1 X3), (X1 X3)yvur ′(Y2Y3)γ ′0,
hr
′(−α0x j /x0+α j )(Y2Y3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
This is properly a distributed challenge-key. It should be noted
that yv modulo p3 was used but not revealed because there
is random parameter γ ′0 modulo p3 which does not appear in
any other component.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t ′, t ′′,
t ′′′ ∈ ZN and returns
{T ywT yv 〈α, Z〉t ′′′v〈α, Z〉t ′gσ 〈α, Z〉t ′2 ,












2 . This implicitly
sets s = τ and t = t ′ + τ t ′′′ modulo p1. Also, G2 parts







where b = τ ′(yw + yv〈α, Z 〉t ′′′ − σ 〈α, Z〉t ′′′), t1 = τ ′t ′′′ + t ′,
t2 = yuτ ′t ′′′ + t ′′. b is not correlated with t1 and t2 because yv
modulo p2 appears only here. Also, due to t ′ and t ′′, t1 and t2
do not correlate. Therefore, the G2 terms here are properly
distributed. If T ∈ G p1 p2 , this B has properly simulated O2.1.
If T ∈ G, we must argue that the G3 terms attached to the
ciphertext are uniformly random in order to claim that B
simulates properly O2.2. Let us denote by G3 the part of




3 . If we also denote by G3 the part
of T as gτ
′′
3 , then t3 = τ ′′(yw+yv〈α, Z〉t ′′′), t4 = τ ′′(〈α, Z 〉t ′′′)
and t5 = τ ′′(yut ′′′) modulo p3. Neither t3 nor t4 correlates
with t5 because of 〈α, Z〉 which is randomly distributed as
〈α, Z〉 modulo p3 do not appear anywhere. Also t3 and t4 do
not correlate to each other because yv does not reveal its value
although it appears within the challenge key. So, the G3 parts
of the challenge ciphertext are properly distributed. 
Lemma 6.3: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-






12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will sim-
ulate O2.2 or O2.3 with A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, y ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , and h = g1. It sends the group
elements to A:





yv : j ∈ [0, ])
This implicitly sets ψ = yw and σ = yv modulo p2 and p3.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set
of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random
b′, t ′, t4, t5 ∈ ZN and returns
{ws(Y2Y3)b′(X1 X2)yv 〈α, Z〉t ′,
(X1 X2)
〈α, Z〉t ′gt43 , (X1 X2)
yut ′gyut53 }.
Then the G1 part of challenge ciphertext properly is distributed
and t = t ′yx1 . We write X1 = g
yx1
1 . Also, the G2 part
of challenge ciphertext, t1 = t ′ modulo p2 and t2 = yut ′
modulo p2, are properly distributed. Moreover, if we




3 , b modulo p2 equal to b
′yy2 . The G3
part also properly distributed with random values, t3 = b′yy3
modulo p3, t4 and t5.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and returns
{T yw, T, T yvur ′(Y2Y3)γ ′0,
hr
′(−a0x j /x0+a j )(Y2Y3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
If T ∈ G p1 p3 , the challenge key type response is identically
distributed to a response from O2.2. If T ∈ G, then the
challenge key-type reponse is identically distributed to a
response from O2.3. 
Lemma 6.4: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O2.3 AdvA−O2.4 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: In this lemma, G p2 and G p3 parts of Assumption 3
are reversed. B is given g1, g2, X1 X3,Y2Y3, T . It will simulate
O2.3 or O2.4 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, ψ, y ′, σ ∈ ZN , and set g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. Then, initial response, normal
keys can be responded by generating them as the same way
of Lemma 6.2.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some iden-
tity i , A chooses a random r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and returns
{(X1 X3g2)yw, (X1 X3g2), (X1 X3g2)yvur ′ (Y2Y3)γ ′0,
hr
′(−a0x j/x0+a j )(Y2Y3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}
This is properly distributed challenge-key. It should be noted
that yv modulo p2 and p3 was used but not revealed because
there is random parameter r ′ modulo p2 and p3 which does
not appear anywhere else.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the
set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing
random t ′, t ′′, t ′′′ ∈ ZN and returning
{T ywT yv 〈α, Z〉t ′′′v〈α, Z〉t ′gσ 〈α, Z〉t ′2 ,








Identically with lemma 6.2, if T ∈ G p1 p2 , this properly simu-
lates O2.4. Also, if T ∈ G, G p3 part of the challenge ciphertext
distributed randomly, and this properly simulates O2.3. 
Lemma 6.5: Suppose there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A such that O2.4 AdvA−O2.5 AdvA = ε . Then we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage
ε in breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate
O2.4 or O2.5 using A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, ỹ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 and h = g1. It sends the following
group elements to A:
(g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , hs ga2 ,
(X1 X3)
ywgyw ỹ2 , (X1 X3)g
ỹ
2 , (X1 X3)
yv gyv ỹ2 : j ∈ [1, ]).
This implicitly sets gy1 = X1 modulo p1 and gỹ3 modulo p3.
Also, ψ = yw and σ = yv modulo p2 and p3.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′′, r ′′, γ ′′0 , . . . γ ′′ ∈ ZN and
returns





r ′′(−α0x j /x0+α j )g
γ ′′j
2 : j ∈ [1, ]}




3 , this implicitly sets
y ′ = yx1 y ′′ and r ′ = yx1r ′′ modulo p1. ỹ ′ equals to y ′′
modulo p2 and yx3 y
′′ modulo p3. Also, ψ = yw modulo
p2 and p3, and σ = yv modulo p2 and p3. γ ′0 equals γ ′′0
modulo p2 and yx3r
′′yu modulo p3. For j ∈ [1, ], γ ′j equals
γ ′′j modulo p2 and yx3r ′′(−α0x j/x0 + α j ) modulo p3.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set
of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random
b, t, α′0, . . . , α′, t1, t2 ∈ ZN and returning







where α′ = (α′0, . . . , α′).
If T ∈ G p1 and gt1 is the G p1 part of T , then this matches
the distribution of O2.4. If T ∈ G p1 p3 , gt1gt
′
3 is the G p1 p3 part
of T , this implicitly sets t3 = 〈α, Z 〉t ′ modulo p3 and t4 = yut ′
modulo p3. This matches the distribution of O2.5 because the
G p3 part in the challenge ciphertext is k-wise independent as
in Lemma 5.1. 
Lemma 6.6: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O2.5 AdvA−O2.6 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will simulate
O2.5 or O2.6 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, ψ, y ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends to A the group elements:











KIM et al.: ADAPTIVELY SECURE IDENTITY-BASED BROADCAST ENCRYPTION 13
This is properly distributed if we set X1 X2 = gs1ga2 . Moreover,
this implies that σ = yv modulo p2 and p3.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN and
returns
{wy′(Y2Y3)ψy′ , hy′(Y2Y3)y′, v y′ur ′(Y2Y3)γ ′0+yv y′,
hr
′(−α0 x j/x0+α j )(Y2Y3)γ
′
j : j ∈ [1, ]}.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
receivers, S, B responds to A returning
{(X1 X2)ywT yv 〈α, Z〉, T 〈α, Z〉, T yu }
Because yw and yv modulo p2 do not appear anywhere else,
gb2 = gayw2 is randomly distributed. T ∈ G p1 p3 , 〈α, Z 〉 modulo
p3 appears to be uniformly random to the adversary since
α j and yu modulo p3 do not appear anywhere else. Hence,
this matches the distribution of O2.6. If T ∈ G, this implies
that α′j = α j modulo p2, t1 = t ′ and t2 = yut ′ where we
denote by G2 the part of T as g
t1
2 . It should be noted that
yu modulo p2 does not appear anywhere else. So, t2 is also
uniformly random to the adversary. Therefore, this matches
the distribution of O2.5. 
Lemma 6.7: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O2.6 AdvA − O2.7 AdvA = ε. Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate
O2.6 or O2.7 with A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, ỹ ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 ,
u = g1, w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends to A the group
elements:
(g, u, w, h, vα j , hα j , hs ga2 , (X1 X3)
ywgyw ỹ2 ,
(X1 X3)
yh g ỹ2 , (X1 X3)
yv gyv ỹ2 : j ∈ [1, ]).
This is properly distributed. Also, ψ = yw and σ = yv
modulo p2, p3.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′′, r ′, γ ′0, . . . , γ ′ ∈ ZN returns





r ′(−α0x j /x0+α j )g
γ ′j
2 : j ∈ [1, − 1]}
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers,
S, B randomly choose b, t1, t2 and responds to A by returning
{ws gb2 T yv 〈α, Z〉, T 〈α, Z〉, T yu }.
This implicitly sets gt1 to be the G p1 part of T . If T ∈ G p1 ,
then this matches the distribution of O2.7. If T ∈ G p1 p3 , for
the same reasons as Lemma 6.5, this matches the distribu-
tion of O2.6. 
Lemma 6.8: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O2.7 AdvA−O2.8 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof: B is given g1, g3, X1 X2,Y2Y3, T . It will sim-
ulate O2.7 or O2.8 with A. It chooses random exponents
yg, yu, yw, yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, y, ψ, σ ∈ ZN , and sets
g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 , w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends to
A the group elements:





σ y : j ∈ [0, ])
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers,
S, B responds to A by choosing random t ∈ ZN and returning





Then the G p1 part of challenge ciphertext properly distributed
if we denotes X1 X2 = gs1g
yx2
1 . Also, the G p2 part of chal-
lenge ciphertext, b = yx2 yw modulo p2. This is a properly
distributed ciphertext because yx2 modulo p2 does not appear
anywhere else.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some
identity i , A chooses a random y ′′, r ′ ∈ ZN and returns
{wy(Y2Y3)ψy′′ , hy(Y2Y3)y′′ , v y(Y2Y3)σ y′′T yu ,
T (−a0x j /x0+a j ) : j ∈ [1, ]}.
The G p1 part of the challenge key is properly distributed if
we implicitly set the G p1 part of T as g
r ′
1 . Moreover, if we





′ is equal to y ′′yy2 modulo p2
and y ′′yy3 modulo p3.
If T ∈ G p1 p3 , the challenge key type response is identically
distributed to a response from O2.8 because α j and yu modulo
p3 do not appear anywhere else. If T ∈ G, then the challenge
key-type response is identically distributed with a response
from O2.7. because α j and yu modulo p2 and p3 do not appear
anywhere else. 
Lemma 6.9: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that O2.8 AdvA − O3 AdvA = ε . Then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B with advantage ε in
breaking Assumption 2.
Proof: B is given g1, g2, X1 X3, T . It will simulate O2.8
or O3 with A. It chooses random exponents yg, yu, yw,
yv , α0, . . . , α, s, a, y2 ∈ ZN , and sets g = gyg1 , u = gyu1 ,
w = gyw1 , v = gyv1 , h = g1. It sends to A the group elements:




2 , (X1 X3)
yv gyv y22 : j ∈ [1, ]).
This is properly distributed and implies that ψ = yw and
σ = yv modulo p2, p3.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of
receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t, t1,
t2 ∈ ZN and returns
{ws gb2v〈α, Z〉t , h〈α, Z〉t , ut }.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some













′(−a0x j /x0+a j ) : j ∈ [1, ]}.
This implicitly sets gr
′
1 to be the G p1 part of T . If T ∈ G p1 p3 ,
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because yu and a j modulo p3 do not appear anywhere else.
Hence, this matches the distribution of O2.8 If T ∈ G p1 , then,
this matches the distribution of O3. 
Lemma 7: Suppose there exists a polynomial time algo-
rithm A such that GameI B B E ′k−1 AdvA−GameI B B E
′
k AdvA = ε.
Then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B with
advantage ε in breaking Assumption 2 or Assumption 3.
Proof: We assume there exists a PPT attacker A who
distinguishes between GameI B B E
′
k−1 and GameI B B E
′
k with
non-negligible advantage. This means that A can distin-
guish at least one of following games such as GameI B B E
′
k−1




k , and Game
EC
k and
GameI B B E
′
k with non-negligible advantage. If this adversary
exists, this can be used to create a PPT algorithm B distin-
guishing one of following pairs of oracles such as O0 and O1,
O1 and O2 and O2 and O3 with non-negligible advantage.
However, this violates one of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6.
Assuming that B interacts with one of O0, O1, O2 and O3.
Each oracle outputs as an initial response the group elements




σ ỹ : ∀ j ∈ [0, ]}.
B randomly chooses δ ∈ ZN , and gives to A the public
parameters,
P K = {N,G, g, u, w, vα j , hα j , e(g, h)δ : ∀ j ∈ [0, ]}.
To create the first k − 1 semi-functional keys, B generates
K0, K1, K2, and K3, j using the key generation algorithm.
Then, it randomly chooses δ, y ′i ∈ ZN and, by using the
semi-functional elements in the initial response, constructs
semi-functionl keys as:
K ′0 = gδK0(wy(g2g3)ψ ỹ)y
′
i , K ′1 = K1(hy(g2g3)ψ ỹ)y
′
i ,
K ′2 = K2(v y(g2g3)σ ỹ)y
′
i , K ′3, j = K3, j : j ∈ [1, ]
This implicitly sets yi = yy ′i + y ′′i modulo p1 and y = yy ′i
modulo p2, p3 when we let y ′′i be a randomization parameter
shared in the first three components of the normal key for
identity i .
For responding normal keys (> k), B generates normal
keys by the key generation algorithm. This is possible because
B knows M SK = {δ}. It forwarded a normal key to the A.
If A requests the kth key for some identity i , B makes a
challenge key-type query to the oracle with i . Then, oracle
returns group elements, {T0, T1, T2, T3, j : j ∈ [1, ]}.
B constructs the challenge key for A as:
K0 = gδT0, K1 = T1, K2 = T2, K3, j = T3, j : j ∈ [1, ]
If the oracle which B interacts with is O0, this challenge key
is a properly distributed normal key. If the oracle is O1, this
key will be a properly distributed ephemeral key. If the oracle
is O2, this key will be distributed as ephemeral key, properly.
If B is interacting with O3, this will be distributed as a proper
semi-functional key.
When A requests challenge-ciphertext with the set of
receivers S for messages M0, M1, B forwards this query to
the oracle and the received group elements (T ′1, T ′2, T ′3). Then
B choose f ∈ {0, 1}, and construct the ciphertext as:
C = M f e(gδ, hs ga2 ),C0 = hs ga2 ,C1 = T ′1,C2 = T ′2, C3 = T ′3
and returns it to A.
If B is interacting with O0, O1, O3 then the challenge
ciphertext will be a properly distributed semi-functional
ciphertext. Otherwise, if the oracle which B interacts is O2,
then the challenge ciphertext will be an properly distributed
ephemeral ciphertext.
Thus, if B interacts with O0, O1, O2 and O3, then it
has properly simulated GameI B B E
′
k−1 , GameE Kk , Game
EC
k and
GameI B B E
′
k , respectively. Thus, if A distinguishes at least one
of the pairs of games with non-negligible advantage, B can use
this to distinguish a corresponding pair of oracles with non-
negligible advantage. This violates Lemmas 3, 4 or 5. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the adaptively secure identity-
based broadcast encryption scheme featuring constant size
ciphertext. The public parameters and private keys in our
scheme increase linearly with the maximum number of
receivers, but not the total number of users. Also, the computa-
tional complexity of the decryption process of our scheme only
depends on the number of receivers. Finally, we showed that
our scheme is adaptively secure under the general decisional
subgroup assumption instead of multiple subgroup decisional
assumptions in the standard model through the use of the dual
system encryption technique.
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